

Where do beneficiaries come from and how do they come about?

Sources for beneficiary expressions in Classical Greek and the typology of beneficiary

1. Introduction*

In this paper, I analyze different ways of coding beneficiary in Ancient Greek: through the plain dative and through prepositional phrases. The coding of beneficiary through the dative case is attested throughout the history of the Greek language,¹ and appears to be inherited from Proto-Indo-European. Prepositional phrases, on the other hand, are a more recent means of expression. Greek prepositions originate from spatial adverbs; the extension of their meaning from space to more abstract relations is often documented in texts from different periods.²

Different coding possibilities for beneficiary have been the matter of previous research, which I survey in the course of this paper. In addition, I describe various types of beneficiary. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I sketch a brief typology of beneficiary roles. In section 3 I describe the Greek data, which are of special interest because they offer the possibility to follow the diachronic development of beneficiary expressions from Homeric to Classical Greek. In section 4 I discuss the evidence provided by such diachronic analysis. The results are two-fold: in the first place, I suggest that Ancient Greek underwent a change with respect to the typology sketched in section 2. In the second place, I discuss different patterns of polysemy for various types of beneficiary, depending on the choice between dative coding and prepositional coding. In section 5 I summarize the findings and add some conclusions.

2. The semantic role beneficiary

2.1. Prototypical and non-prototypical beneficiary

Following current definitions, beneficiary is the semantic role of a human participant who

* I thank Seppo Kittilä for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

¹ That is, during the time span that precedes the loss of the dative case in Byzantine Greek.

² See Luraghi (2003).

benefits from a state of affairs, such as *for my mom* in (1):

1. *I bought a present for my mom.*

Typically, from the syntactic point of view, beneficiary is a role taken by adverbials, rather than by arguments, that is, beneficiary constituents are non-obligatory. Accordingly, (2) is also possible:

2. *I bought a present.*

Lehmann *et al.* (2000: 68) describe the prototypical beneficiary situation³ as “a controlled one, it contains an actor, which is here the BENEFICIENT. In addition, a prototypical beneficiary situation includes an undergoer, which is made as BENEFACTUM to the benefit of the Beneficiary. Beneficiary situations without beneficent or BENEFACTUM are not prototypical”.⁴ According to this definition, (1) refers to a prototypical beneficiary situation, because it contains a beneficent (the agent NP *I*), and a benefactum (the object NP *a present*). Non-prototypical situations are those in (3) and (4):⁵

3. *This handbook is very useful for my students.*⁶

4. *The lawyer spoke for his client.*

Example (3) does not contain a beneficent (there is no agent NP), but it does contain a benefactum, which here is syntactically the subject, i.e. the NP *this book*. Example (4), on the other hand, does not contain a benefactum, but it does contain a beneficent, the agent/subject NP *the lawyer*. Note further that example (4) may have the two readings in (4a) and (4b):

- 4a. *The lawyer spoke in favor of his client*

³ ‘Situation’ is used here and in the rest of the paper to indicate all types of state of affairs.

⁴ “eine kontrollierte, enthält also einen Actor, der hier der BENEFIZIENT ist. In einer prototypischen benefaktiven Situation ist weiterhin ein Undergoer eingeschlossen, der als BENEFAKTUM zugunsten des Benefiziärs geschaffen ... wird. ... Benefaktive Situationen ohne Benefizient oder ohne BENEFAKTUM sind nicht prototypisch.”

⁵ Lehmann *et al.* (2000) do not add examples of these two types of non-prototypical beneficiary situations.

⁶ Note that *This handbook is very useful* is also possible: I do not consider such sentences here because the beneficiary is not expressed, albeit implied (if something is useful, it must necessarily be useful for somebody).

4b. *The lawyer spoke on behalf of his client.*

I will elaborate on the difference between the two possible interpretations (and the two possible states of affairs) in the next section.

2.2. *Agentive and event beneficiary*

Smith (2005) focuses on the difference between beneficiary in the case that the state of affairs in which the beneficiary occurs is brought about by an agent or not, and writes that “One type [of beneficiary construction] always includes an agent, and it expresses the idea that the agent intentionally carries out the act for the affectee, and the act is presented as good for the affectee. I refer to this type as the “agentive benefactive” construction. The other covers more general benefactive events, and I call this type the “event benefactive” construction ... whenever an event *is* agentless, it is always expressed by an event benefactive construction” (2005: 41).⁷

Event beneficiary corresponds to non-prototypical cases in which, using the terminology in Lehmann *et al.* (2000), no beneficiary occurs; agentive beneficiary, on the other hand, may correspond to prototypical beneficiary, if a benefactum also occurs, or it may correspond to non-prototypical beneficiary in which there is an agent, but no benefactum. So, with respect to the examples in section 2.1, agentive beneficiary includes beneficiaries in (1), (4a) and (4b), while event beneficiary corresponds to the beneficiary in (3).

It needs to be remarked at this point that all types of agentive beneficiary, i.e. all beneficiary situations that contain a human beneficiary, either prototypical or not, contain a possible controller, under whose intentionality the situation is brought about. As we will see in sections 3 and 4, the feature of intentionality plays an important role in the coding of beneficiary in Classical Greek, even where no activity is overtly indicated (i.e. with states).

Note that my definition of event beneficiary in this paper does not correspond exactly to the definition in Smith (2005), because it does not include situations in which neither a beneficiary nor a benefactum occur, such as the ones in (5) and (6) (from Smith forthcoming):

5. *ame ga yande-kure-ta*
rain SUBJ stop-GIVE-PST
“It stopped raining (and I am thankful for that).” (Japanese)

⁷ I borrow Smith’s terminology in the rest of this paper, with some differences described below.

6. *I get to go to the beach this weekend.*

Rather, I consider instances of event beneficiary only those that do contain a benefactum, as shown in (3). As I will show in sections 3 and 4, possible occurrence or non-occurrence of a benefactum is one of the parameters that determines the choice of specific coding devices in Classical Greek.

Let us now turn to conceptual differences between the three possible situations in which agentive beneficiary occurs. A crucial difference in the role taken by the beneficent emerges between (1) and (4a) on the one hand, and (4b) on the other. Both in the prototypical beneficiary situation (as in (1)) and in the case of (4a), the beneficent acts to the benefit of the beneficiary, but not in his/her place. In (4b), which I will call ‘behalf beneficiary’, the beneficent acts in the place of the beneficiary, that is, the beneficent substitutes for the beneficiary. In occurrences such as (4b) it is implied that the beneficent cannot perform the action and needs the beneficiary to perform it in his/her place.⁸

Indeed, behalf beneficiary is not restricted to occurrences in which there is no benefactum, since one can say for example:

7. *I wrote a letter on his behalf*

However, the relation of the benefactum to the beneficiary is complex: in (7) it is said that the letter was written on behalf of somebody, but this does not imply that the beneficiary will ever also be a possible recipient of the letter, or will gain control over it in some other way, while a normal reading of the prototypical beneficiary situation, as the one in (1), is that the beneficiary is also the intended recipient of the benefactum (even if this is not necessarily so). This point is made clear by example (8):

8. *The vice president delivered a speech on behalf of the president, who was absent.*

Here, the beneficiary benefits from the activity of the agent as a whole, rather than from the benefactum. The existence of a benefactum remains on the background, because the important fact in this case is substitution. This is also remarked in Kittilä (2005: 273), who

⁸ This type of beneficiary is also called ‘deputative-benefactive’; see Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 384).

writes “whether the result of the event is regarded as beneficial is less relevant here”. Thus, events containing behalf beneficiary are similar to non-prototypical beneficiary events that do not contain a benefactum, even in cases in which a concrete object is made or effected to the benefit of the beneficiary.

Indeed, as noted in Lehmann *et al.* (2000: 93), a beneficiary is prototypically conceived of as exerting some degree of control over the benefactum. This feature of beneficiary is common both to prototypical beneficiary, and to event beneficiary, thus overriding the possible occurrence of a beneficent.

From the above discussion, it appears that there are two possible poles of the beneficiary event that may be profiled: either the beneficent or the benefactum. I will return on the relevance of this possible contrast in the next two sections.

2.3. *Recipient and beneficiary*

A typology of beneficiary expressions has recently been put forward in Kittilä (2005).⁹ I will briefly summarize it here.

Kittilä takes as his starting point the remark that, as commonly noted in research about beneficiaries, beneficiary is conceptually similar to another semantic role, recipient. Syntactically, the obvious difference between the two roles is that recipient is the role of an obligatory constituent, while beneficiary is non-obligatory (see also Kittilä and Zúñiga forthcoming b). Let us now turn to the conceptual similarity.

As remarked in the literature about beneficiary, in the prototypical beneficiary situation there may be no actual transfer (see Goldberg 1995: 37); still, under normal conditions it is assumed that the intention of the beneficent is to actually transfer the benefactum to the beneficiary. This makes the beneficiary similar to a recipient: the intentions of a beneficent are similar to the intentions of a giver, even if the beneficent does not necessarily also act as a giver. Such similarity is mirrored by the fact that in several languages, including English, this type of beneficiary can be encoded as recipient:

9. *I bought my mom a present.*¹⁰

⁹ See further Kittilä and Zúñiga (forthcoming). An earlier typology of beneficiary can be found in Van Valin and LaPolla (1997: 382-384).

¹⁰ This sentence, which contains a beneficiary in the dative-shift construction, has pragmatic implication as opposed to the corresponding sentence in which the beneficiary is indicated by a PP (*I bought a present for my mom*), see e. g. Goldberg (1995). This feature of the construction goes beyond the scope of the present paper.

Kittilä uses the term ‘recipient-beneficiary’ for beneficiaries such as *my mom* in (1) and (9). He then turns to beneficiaries that do not, in any case, gain control of a concrete entity as a result of benefaction. The latter broadly correspond to non-prototypical beneficiaries that occur in situations in which there is no benefactum, as defined in Lehmann *et al.* (2000: 68), and are agentive beneficiaries in the terms of Smith (2005). This type of beneficiary is exemplified in (4); a further example is (10):

10. *I told a lie for him (= in order to help him).*

As we have already seen in section 2.1, beneficiaries of this type do not gain control over a concrete entity as a result of benefaction; still the situation provides them with some concrete benefaction. I will use the term concrete beneficiaries for beneficiaries as the one in (10).¹¹

As argued in 2.2, a further possible feature of benefaction is substitution. Substitution holds in states of affairs in which a person carries out an action on behalf of somebody else, as in (4b) and (8). According to Kittilä, this type of beneficiary, i.e. behalf beneficiary in my terminology, groups together with the second type (non-recipient, concrete beneficiary) in the coding of beneficiary role cross linguistically. However, the Greek evidence points toward the existence of a distinction between the two, as we will see in section 3 and 4.

Based on a sample of genetically unrelated languages, Kittilä finds the following possible types of coding:

- (a) tripartite languages, which code recipient, recipient-beneficiary, and other types of beneficiary in three different ways;
- (b) recipient prominent languages, in which recipient-beneficiary is always coded in the same way as recipient;
- (c) beneficiary prominent languages, in which all types of beneficiary are coded in the same way, but not in the same way as recipient;
- (d) neutral languages, in which recipient and all types of beneficiary are coded in the same way.

In addition, some of the languages that mostly behave as those in one of the four types above,

¹¹ Newman (1996: 220) speaks of “true” benefactives in cases in which there is no benefactum, because only in such cases it is possible to rule out a recipient interpretation.

may be ‘fluid’, i.e. occasionally display features of one of the other type, especially in cases in which possible ambiguity may arise. An example, according to Kittilä (2005: 289-290), is Vietnamese, a “typical neutral language”, in which “there is an unambiguous encoding mechanism available for the role of beneficiary”.

English conforms to type (a). In English, recipient-beneficiary can be coded in the same way as recipient, i.e. with a dative shift construction, but when prepositional phrases are used, recipient takes *to*, while recipient-beneficiary takes *for*, in much the same way as other types of beneficiary. However, the latter cannot be coded with dative shift, as shown in the examples below (from Kittilä 2005: 278):

11. a. *s/he gave the book to me*
- b. *s/he gave me the book*
- c. *s/he baked a cake for me*
- d. *s/he baked me a cake*
- e. *s/he went to the market for me*
- f. **s/he went me to the market*

In Kittilä’s sample, the only two languages which conform to type (a) are English and Icelandic.¹²

Note that in his (2005) paper, Kittilä does not mention the other non-prototypical type of beneficiary situation mentioned in Lehmann *et al.* (2000), which I have called event beneficiary adapting the terminology in Smith (2005), i.e. the one exemplified in (3), in which there is no agent (no beneficiary).

2.4. A typology of beneficiary

From the above discussion, relevant features for the typology of beneficiary appear to be the following:

- (a) presence/absence of an entity over which the beneficiary gains control and that s/he may receive as a result of benefaction;

¹² Indeed most modern Indo-European languages that have an inflectional dative, such as German, the Slavic languages, and the Romance languages (which have an inflectional dative limited to certain pronouns), seem to conform to this type. I cannot discuss this matter here, since it goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it certainly deserves to be pursued further.

- (b) presence/absence of an agent or possible controller by whose intention the event of benefaction is brought about;
- (c) substitution of the beneficiary by another agent.

Combining Kittilä's typology with the remarks in Lehmann *et al.* (2000) and in Smith (2005), I will make use of the following types of beneficiary role:

- recipient beneficiary (RB), as in (1): it occurs in prototypical beneficiary events, when both a beneficent and a benefactum also occur;
- concrete beneficiary, further subdivided into:
 - concrete beneficiary/agentive (agentive CB): it occurs in beneficiary events in which a beneficent also occurs, but not a benefactum, as in (4a);
 - concrete beneficiary/event (event CB): it occurs in beneficiary events in which a benefactum also occurs, but there is no beneficent (i.e. there is no agent) , as in (3);
- behalf beneficiary (BB), as in (4b), (7), and (8).

As we will see in section 3, this typology does not account for all possible types of beneficiary in Classical Greek. Consequently, I will argue for the existence of a further type of event CB (see especially section 3.3.2).

2.5. *Malefactive*

Also connected with beneficiary, albeit often only mentioned with no further discussion,¹³ is malefactive, the role of the entity (normally a human being) to the detriment of which a state of affairs is brought about, as in (12):

12. *John cheated on Mary.*

In many languages of Europe, in which beneficiary is coded through the dative case, malefactive can also be coded in the same way. An example is Italian:

¹³ Cf. Kittilä and Zúñiga (forthcoming)

13. *Lo sciopero dei treni mi ha reso impossibile il ritorno*
the strike of+the trains me:DAT has made impossible the return
“the train strike made my return trip impossible”.

This pattern is typical of most Indo-European languages; a discussion of coding patterns with further examples can be found in Radetzky and Smith (forthcoming). Alternatively, prepositions can occur, as in:

14. *The soldiers fought against the enemy.*¹⁴

In the latter case, prepositions that code beneficiary and malefactive are different: in other words, when more semantic content is expressed the two opposite notions of benefaction and malefaction are kept distinct. I will elaborate on this topic below, discussing the Greek data (sec. 3 and 4).

3. The Greek evidence

Classical Greek is the language of Attic-Ionic writers active approximately in the 5th century BCE. Earlier literary evidence is provided mainly by the Homeric poems, written in the 8th century BCE, but composed orally about three centuries earlier. The term Ancient Greek is used to refer to the complex of ancient Greek texts, starting with the earliest ones and up to the end of antiquity.

Ancient Greek has an inflectional case system which comprises nominative, accusative, dative, genitive, and vocative. Cases code grammatical relations and partly semantic roles; besides, semantic roles are coded by adpositions (pre- or postpositions in Homeric Greek, later prepositions).

In this section, I first survey the Classical Greek data, and will show that Classical Greek conforms to type (a) in Kittilä (2005). Then I proceed to the Homeric evidence, and show that the extent to which the dative could code beneficiary was larger than in Classical Greek. Homeric Greek conformed to type (d), that is, neutral languages, with some fluid features needed for the coding of BB. As we will see, in the change from Homeric to Classical Greek a relevant role is played by features of different types of CB.

¹⁴ Note that expressions such as *fight against somebody* are not normally treated in discussions about malefactive. However, they clearly should be, given the fact that the parallel expression *fight for somebody* is usually regarded as containing a beneficiary.

3.1. The dative

The dative case typically codes recipient and addressee in Ancient Greek.¹⁵ Third arguments of verbs of giving and verbs of communication, which have such semantic roles, take the dative, as shown in (15) and (16):

15. *dôka dé hoi krētêra*
give:AOR.1SG PTC 3SG.DAT mixing.bowl:ACC
“I gave him a mixing bowl” (Hom. *Od.* 24.275);
16. *all' áge moi tóde eipè*
PTC carry:IMP.2SG 1SG.DAT DEM.N/A say:IMP.2SG
“but come on, tell me this” (Hom. *Od.* 1.169).

In (15) the dative *hoi* ‘to him’ is the third argument of the verb *dôka* ‘I gave’ and has the semantic role recipient, while in example (16) the dative *moi* ‘to me’ is the third argument of the verb *eipé* ‘tell’ and has the semantic role addressee. Note that the recipient in (15) can be regarded as the prototypical instance of this semantic role, as argued in Kittilä (2005: 274). The construction in (15) is the prototypical instance of the ‘give-construction’ in Greek.¹⁶

To a limited extent, verbs whose argument structure conforms to the *give*-construction may take a PP formed by the preposition *eis* (Attic) or *es* (Ionic) with the accusative.¹⁷ This preposition means ‘to’, and usually codes direction with motion verbs. The occurrence of *eis* with verbs of giving follows a common semantic extension, also shown by English *to*, which conceives of human beings as destinations, in case they are the target of an event of transfer.

In Classical Greek, *eis* with the accusative extends to events of transfer limited to cases where transfer is abstract, as shown in (17) below. Besides, it can extend to events of communication, which can also be conceived of as abstract transfer. In (17) *eis* with the accusative occurs with the verb *parékhein* ‘offer’, which typically takes the dative, while in (18) it occurs with the verb *légein* ‘say’:

¹⁵ See Schwyzer (1950) for general reference on the use of Greek cases; for further reference on Homeric Greek, see Chantraine (1953). On the coding of semantic roles in Homeric and Classical Greek, see Luraghi (2003).

¹⁶ See Newman (1998) on recipients and the *give*-construction.

¹⁷ Greek prepositions may take one, two or three different cases. Of the ones considered in this paper, *eis* always takes the accusative and *pró* always takes the genitive, *hupér* and *katá* may take either the genitive or the accusative, while *prós* and *epí* may take one of three cases, genitive, dative, or accusative. On the complex semantic differences connected with case variation in Greek, see Luraghi (2003).

17. *ouk àn aiskhúnoio eis toùs Hállēnas sautòn*
 NEG PTC be.ashamed:OPT.PRS.M/P.2SG to ART.ACC.PL Greek:ACC.PL REFL.2SG.ACC
sophistēn parékhōn?
 sophist:ACC present:PART.PRS.NOM
 “would you not be ashamed to present yourself before the Greeks as a sophist?” (Pl. *Prt.* 312a);
18. *kai álla légōn es autòn thumalgéa épea*
 and INDEF.N/A.PL tell:PART.PRS.NOM to DEM.ACC heart.grieving:N/A.PL word:N/A.PL
 “and telling him other bitter mockery” (Hdt. 1.129.1).

As argued in Luraghi (2003: 112-116), *eis* with the accusative in such passages is not semantically equivalent to the dative. The preposition profiles a unidirectional trajectory, while the dative case simply indicates a certain degree of affectedness in Greek (see Luraghi 2003: 63-64). For example, in (18) the context makes it clear that the passage refers to unidirectional communication, see Luraghi (2003: 112).

The notion of spatial trajectory is mapped on an abstract plane onto the notion of relation: indeed, *eis* is common in passages where a relation between human beings is described as holding from one person toward the other, as in *philía eis tiná* ‘friendship towards somebody’.¹⁸ Besides, *eis* with the accusative does not occur with the verb *dídōmi* ‘give’, i.e. it does not code the prototypical recipient. Thus, one cannot consider the preposition *eis* with the accusative as a possible alternative to the dative for the coding of recipient or addressee. This type of PP should rather be viewed as providing a coding means for some sort of other participant, which is similar to recipient or addressee, but occurs in a construction in which the profiled feature is not reception, but rather a relation, conceptualized as an (abstract) trajectory.

Closely connected with beneficiary is the so-called *dativus sympatheticus*, which occurs in constructions that contain external possessors. Such constructions are referred to by Lehmann *et al.* (2000: 69) as containing an ‘inherent relation’ between beneficiary and benefactum. External possessor is typical of many ancient and modern Indo-European languages.¹⁹ An example from Homeric Greek is (19):

¹⁸ Note further that *eis* does not code a concrete direction in events of motion with the singular of human landmarks in Classical Greek: with such landmarks, this type of PPs only codes abstract direction, in examples such as the ones mentioned in this section. See section 4.2.1 for further details.

¹⁹ See Haspelmath (1999) for reference on the languages of Europe, and Havers (1911) on the ancient Indo-European languages, including Greek.

19. *têi per dōdeka paîdes enì megároisin ólonto*
 DEM.DAT PTC twelve child:ACC.PL in palace:DAT.PL die:AOR.MID.3PL
 “twelve of her children died in the palace, twelve children died on her in the palace”
 (Hom. *Od.* 24.603).

The German example below is from Lehmann *et al.* (2000: 69):²⁰

20. *Ihm ist der Vater gestorben*
 3SG.DAT be:3SG ART.NOM father die:PART
 “his father died, the father died on him”.

The fact that the dative can be employed in such constructions is clearly related with its use in prototypical beneficiary and malefactive expressions; I am not going to discuss this matter here, because my main interest is in the meaning of alternative types of expression (i.e. on the semantic extension undergone by prepositions, as alternative to the dative).

3.2. Recipient beneficiary

Recipient beneficiary, as described in Kittilä (2005), occurs in what Lehmann *et al.* (2000) regard as the prototypical beneficiary situation. It is coded through the dative case:

21. *têi idíai aretêi koinèn tèn eleutherían kai toís állois ektésanto*
 ART.DAT own:DAT merit:DAT common:ACC ART.ACC freedom:ACC also ART.DAT.PL
 other:DAT.PL gain:AOR.MID.3PL
 “they obtained through their own merit freedom for all others as well” (Lys. 2.44);
22. *pháinetai dè kai Samíois Ameinoklês Korínthios*
 appear:PRS.3SG PTC also Samian:DAT.PL Ameinocles:NOM Corinthian:NOM
naupēgòs naûs poiēsas téssaras
 shipwright:NOM ship:ACC.PL make:PART.AOR.NOM four:ACC
 “here is Ameinocles, a Corinthian shipwright, who made four ships for the Samians”
 (Th. 1.13.3);
23. *ho d’ ekéleue autoùs oikía te heōutōi áxia*
 DEM.NOM PTC order:IMPF.3SG 3PL.ACC house:N/A.PL PTC RFL.DAT worthy:N/A.PL
tês basilēís oikodomēsai
 ART.GEN royal:GEN build:INF.AOR
 “he ordered them to build him houses worthy of his royal power” (Hdt. 1.98.2).

²⁰ Note that both examples can also be considered occurrences of malefactive.

In (21) the dative NP *toîs állois* ‘the others’ is a RB and the direct object *tên eleutherían* ‘freedom’ is the object received through benefaction; in (22) *Samíois* ‘the Samians’ is the RB of *naûs téssaras* ‘four ships’, and in (23) the pronoun *heōutōi* ‘him’ is the RB of *oikía* ‘houses’.

In addition, the preposition *es/eis* can also code recipient beneficiary to some extent, as shown in the following examples:

24. *ho Kroîsos tò pân es autòn epepoiékee*
 ART.NOM Croesus:NOM ART.N/A all:N/A to 3SG.ACC make:PLPF.3SG
 “Croesus had done all that he could for him” (Hdt. 1.85.1);
25. *theôn mèn eis anthrōpous dōsis*
 god:GEN.PL PTC to man:ACC.PL gift:NOM
 “it is a gift of the gods for mankind” (Pl. *Phlb.* 16c);
26. *pleiō d’ è khília tálanta mátēn eis toûs xénous*
 more PTC than thousand talent:N/A.PL in.vain to ART.ACC.PL mercenary:ACC.PL
anēlōkótes
 pay:PART.PF.NOM.PL
 “we have paid at random more than a thousand talents for the mercenaries” (Isocr. *Areop.* 10).

In the above examples, the relation of benefaction is conceived of as unidirectional motion along a spatial trajectory.²¹ The occurrence of the preposition adds some semantic content, profiling the direction of the relation. In (26) the meaning may be close to purpose, as I will argue below, in section 4.3.

3.3. Concrete beneficiary

In this section, I describe ways of coding agentive CB and event CB in Classical Greek. As remarked above, section 2.4, it turns out from the evidence, that the division into these two sub-types of CB does not account for all relevant distinctions made in this language. As we will see in section 3.3.2, event CBs may contain some features of agency, even when the situation is not an agentful one.

²¹ Note that the noun *dōsis* ‘gift’ is based on the verb *dídōmi* ‘I give’, which takes a recipient NP in the dative as its third argument; however, the verbal noun can also occur without a complement. Thus, *eis anthrōpous* is an optional constituent.

3.3.1. Agentive CB

When an agent, or beneficent, is present, CB is most often coded through the preposition *hupér* ‘over’ with the genitive, as shown in (27) and (28):

27. *kai gàr pollà hupèr emoû eîpe boëthôn emoí*
 also PTC many:N/A.PL over 1SG.GEN say:AOR.3SG help:PART.PRS.NOM 1SG.DAT
 “for even now he said many things in my favor, supporting me” (Pl. *Protag.* 309b);
28. *allà toùs tethneôtas en tôi polémōi axioûntes*
 but ART.ACC.PL die:PART.PF.ACC.PL in ART.DAT war:DAT deserve:PART.PRS.ACC.PL
tôn nomizoménon tugkhánein pròs toùs hetérous hupèr
 ART.GEN.PL think:PART.GEN.PL receive:INF.PRS toward ART.ACC.PL other:ACC.PL over
amphotérōn ekindúneusan, hupèr mèn tôn, hina mēkéti eis toùs
 both:GEN.PL run.risk:AOR.3PL over PTC ART.GEN.PL in.order no.longer to ART.ACC.PL
tethneôtas examartánontes pleiō perì toùs theoûs
 die:PART.PF.ACC.PL fail:PART.PRS.NOM.PL longer about ART.ACC.PL god:ACC.PL
exubrísōsin, hupèr dè tôn hetérōn, hina mē próteron eis tēn
 outrage:PRS.3PL over PTC ART.GEN.PL other:GEN.PL in.order not before to ART.ACC
hautōn apélthōsi patriou timês atukhésantes
 RFL.GEN.PL leave:AOR.3SG homeland:GEN honor:GEN fail:PART.AOR.NOM.PL
 “but thinking it right that those who had died in the war should receive the customary treatment, they risked combat against one of the parties in the interest of both, that on the one side they should cease from grossly outraging the gods by their trespass against the dead, and that on the other they should not hasten away to their own land frustrated of an ancestral honor.” (Lys. 2.9).

In (27) the CB *hupèr emoû* ‘for me’ benefits from the event; note that the context makes clear that the agent helped the speaker in a discussion, rather than speak in his place. Thus, this is not an instance of BB. Example (28) contains various instances of CB: *hupèr amphotérōn* ‘for both’, *hupèr mèn tôn* ‘for the former’, *hupèr dè tôn* ‘for the latter’. Again, these are not instances of BB: the passage does not say that the agent acts on behalf of the beneficiary, that is in the place of the beneficiary, but rather that the agent acts to the benefit of the beneficiary.

3.3.2. Event CB

Let us now turn to occurrences which do not contain an agent, or beneficent.

Especially with the verb ‘be’, CB can also be coded through the proposition *prós* with the

genitive, as in (29):

29. *elpísas pròs heōutoû tòn khrēsmòn ênai*
hope:PART.AOR.NOM from RFL.3SG.GEN ART.ACC oracle:ACC be:INF.PRS
“having thought that the oracle was in his favor” (Hdt. 1.75.2).

The spatial meaning of *pròs* with the genitive is ‘from the side of’, and it usually occurs with human landmarks; another extension of its meaning is ‘by’ in agent phrases. I will discuss the extension to beneficiary below, in section 4.

Note that (29) does not contain an agent; rather, it seems to be an occurrence of event beneficiary. However, an oracle is an entity which may exert influence, and thus, to some extent, control, over a human being. This point is made clearer in (30), also with the verb ‘be’, where some agency is implied, albeit not clearly indicated (the subject of the verb ‘be’ is not an agent), because the favorable entity is a human being, and the feature of agency implied here is intentionality:

30. *Kallías mèn dokeî moi mála pròs Prōtagórou ênai*
Callias:NOM PTC seem:PRS.3SG 1SG.DAT very toward Protagors:GEN be:INF.PRS
“it seems to me that Callias is all for supporting Protagoras” (Pl. *Protag.* 336d).

That the occurrences in (29) and (30) are not completely agentless is also shown by the fact that where no influence of some possible agent is implied we find another construction, that is the dative or a PP with *eis* and the accusative. Note that coding in this case is the same as for RB. Example (31) contains coordinated occurrences of both constructions:

31. *dokein oûn sphísi kai nûn ámeinon ênai tèn heautôn*
seem:INF.PRS PTC 3PL.DAT and now better:N/A be:INF.PRS ART.ACC REFL.GEN.PL
pólin teîkos ékhein, kai idéai toîs polítais kai
city:ACC wall:N/A have:INF.PRS and particularly ART.DAT.PL citizen:DAT.PL and
es toûs pántas xummákhous ôphelimóteron ésesthai
to ART.ACC.PL all:ACC.PL ally:ACC.PL useful:CMPR.N/A be:INF.FUT
“that they now thought it fit that their city should have a wall, and that this would be more beneficial to both the citizens themselves and all allies” (Th. 1.91.6).

In (31) event CB is coded once through the dative (*toîs polítais* ‘for the citizens’), and the second time through a PP formed by *es* with the accusative (*es toûs pántas xummákhous* ‘for all the allies’).

The examples discussed show that not all CBs in this section are the same regarding the event/agentive parameter. None of the examples discussed contains an acting beneficent; still, in (29) and (30) a potential beneficent is mentioned, who is not actively involved in the situation, but still exerts a relevant feature of agency, that is intentionality as in (30) or control as in (29). Note that neither (29) nor (30) contain a benefactum (in fact, they contain an intransitive predicate that indicates a state, the verb ‘be’).

In (31), on the other hand, we find the adjective *ōphelimōteron* ‘more useful’, a benefactum, *teikos* ‘a wall’, but no mention is made of an agent or beneficent. Thus, only this last example contains a real event CB.

3.3.3. Means of coding and types of CB

To sum up, CB is coded through *hupér* with the genitive in case it occurs with an agent who brings about the state of affairs which is beneficial for the beneficiary.

In cases of event beneficiary, the coding is twofold. CB may be coded as RB, that is either through the dative or through a PP constituted by *eis* with the accusative. This type of coding occurs when no mention is made of any human entity (or entity somehow capable of control) other than the beneficiary. I will refer only to this type of CB as ‘event CB’. In the case some controlling entity is mentioned, which in spite of not having an active role in bringing about the benefit for the beneficiary can influence the situation through intentionality, *prós* with the genitive is used. I will refer to this type of CB as ‘semi-agentive CB’.

3.4. *Behalf beneficiary*

Similar to CB, BB is also coded through *hupér* with the genitive, as shown in (32) and (33):

32. *kaì paúsēsth’ autòs mèn oudèn hékastos poiēsein elpízōn,*
 and stop:INF.M/P 3SG.NOM PTC NEG each:NOM make:INF.AOR hope:PART.PRS.NOM
tòn dè plēsion pánth’ hupèr autoû práxein
 ART.ACC PTC neighbor:ACC all:N/A over 3SG.GEN do:INF.AOR
 “and if each man will cease to expect that, while he does nothing himself, his neighbor will do everything for him” (Dem. 4.7);

33. *ouk éni d’ autòn argoúnt’ oudè toís philois*
 NEG one:DAT PTC 3SG.ACC be.idle:PART.PRS.ACC NEG ART.DAT.PL friend:DAT.PL
epitáttein hupèr hautoû ti poieîn

order:INF.PRS over REFL.GEN INDEF.N/A do:INF.PRS
 “but one who is himself idle cannot possibly call upon his friends to do something in his place” (Dem. 2.23).

Both in (32) and in (33) reference is made to an agent who acts not only to the benefit, but in the place of the beneficiary, thus substituting for the beneficiary.

3.5. *Malefactive*

Similar to beneficiary, malefactive (sometimes also called ‘maleficiary’, see Kittilä and Zúñiga forthcoming) is often coded through the dative case. An example is *autoîs* ‘to them’ in (34):

34. *anth’hôn ho tôn nómon titheîs thánaton autoîs*
 for REL.GEN.PL ART.NOM ART.ACC law:ACC make:PART.PRS.NOM death:ACC 3PL.DAT
epoîēse tēn zēmían
 make:AOR.3SG ART.ACC penalty:ACC
 “for these reasons the legislator established the death penalty for them” (Lys. 1.34).

Depending on specific verbs, malefactive can also be coded through *eis* with the accusative, again similar to RB, as in (35):

35. *examartánein eis tēn gunaîka tēn emēn*
 wrong:INF.PRS to ART.ACC woman:ACC ART.ACC POSS.1SG.ACC
 “to wrong my wife” (Lys. 1.26).

In (35) the occurrence of the preposition is conditioned by the verb *examartánein* ‘to wrong somebody’; note however that the *eis* NP is not obligatory.²²

Other ways to code malefactive include a number of prepositional phrases, with prepositions that indicate directional motion and mean ‘against’:

36. *ei Philippos láboi kath’ hēmôn toioûton kairón*
 if Philip:NOM take:OPT.AOR.3SG against 1PL.GEN such:ACC chance:ACC
 “if Philip had such a chance against us” (Dem. 1.24);

²² The verb *examartánein* ‘to wrong’ is not attested in Homer; consequently a diachrony of the constructions in which it occurs cannot be provided.

37. *hoì ouk epì nóon poiéousi Pérsēisi strateúesthai epì*
 REL.NOM.PL NEG on mind:ACC make:PRS.3PL Persian:DAT.PL fight:INF.PRS.M/P on
Ludoús
 Lydian:ACC.PL
 “(the gods), who do not put into the Persians’ mind to do an expedition against the
 Lydians” (Hdt. 1.71.4);
38. *all’ agōnizómenos pròs álla sōmata kai makhómenos*
 but fight:PART.PRS.NOM toward other:N/A.PL body:N/A.PL and fight:PART.PRS.NOM
anankázōito diágein tòn bíon?
 be.forced:OPT.PRS.3SG lead:PRS.INF ART.ACC life:ACC
 “he were forced to pass his days in contention and strife with other people?” (Pl. *Rep.*
 579d).

In (36) malefactive is coded through *katá* with the genitive (*kath’hēmôn* ‘against us’); in (37) we find a malefactive coded through *epì* with the accusative (*epì Ludoús* ‘against the Lydians’); finally, in (38) the malefactive PP contains *pròs* with the accusative (*pròs álla sōmata* ‘against other people’); a further occurrence of this type of PP is *pròs toùs hetérous* ‘against one of the parties’ in (28).

3.6. Beneficiary in Homeric Greek

3.6.1. Recipient beneficiary

In Homeric Greek, the extent to which the dative can code beneficiary is wider than in later prose writers. In the first place, the dative codes RB, as in (39) and (40):

39. *têi d’ ára díphron heloûsa*
 DEM.DAT PTC PTC seat:ACC take:PART.AOR.NOM
 “having fetched a seat for her” (Hom. *Il.* 3.424);
40. *álloisin dè súas siálous antitállō édmenai*
 other:DAT.PL PTC pig:ACC.PL fat:ACC.PL feed:PRS.1SG eat:INF.PRS.M/P
 “I feed fat pigs for others to eat” (Hom. *Od.* 14.41).

Contrary to Classical Greek, RB cannot be coded through *eis* with the accusative in Homeric Greek. Thus, RB is always coded in the same way as recipient.

3.6.2. Concrete beneficiary

The dative can code both agentive and event CB in Homeric Greek:

41. *toîsin dè Khrúsēs megál'eúkheto*
DEM.DAT.PL PTC Cryses:NOM greatly pray:IMPF.3SG
“for them Cryses prayed greatly” (Hom. *Il.* 1.450);
42. *kai tòt' épeitá toi eîmi Diòs potì ... dô*
and then immediately 2SG.DAT go:PRS.1SG Zeus:GEN toward palace:ACC.PL
“and then I will immediately go for you to Zeus’ palace” (Hom. *Il.* 1.426);
43. *ouk àn emoí ge elpoménōi tà génoit'*
NEG PTC 1SG.DAT PTC hope:PART.PRS.DAT DEM.N/A be:AOR.OPT.3SG
“those things will not become true for me, albeit hoping” (Hom. *Od.* 3.228-229).

In section 3.3 we saw that the dative can code event CB. In Homer, the dative occurs both with event CB, as in (43), and with agentive CB. In (41) it is said that an agent, Cryses, performs the action of praying to the benefit of someone. Similarly, in (42) the speaker promises to go to Zeus to the benefit of the hearer.²³

The Homeric data does not seem to support the existence of a specific coding for semi-agentive CB, as described in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. In passages where *prós* with the genitive occurs with the verb ‘be’ and with human or divine landmarks, the PP rather indicates source, as I will show below in section 4.2.3.

It must also be remarked that PPs with *eis* and the accusative do not occur in any type of beneficiary expression in Homeric Greek. As we have seen above, in Classical Greek, *eis* with the accusative provides an alternative both for RB and for event CB.

With verbs of fighting, one finds a small number of occurrences such as the one in (44):

44. *mémasan dè kai hôs husmîni mákhesthai khreiô*
be.eager:PLPF.3PL PTC and so battle:DAT fight:INF.PRS necessity:DAT
anankaíēi, pró te paídōn kai prò gunaikôn
urgent:DAT before PTC child:GEN.PL and before wife:GEN.PL
“but even so were they eager to fight for utter need, for their children’s sake and their wives” (Hom. *Il.* 8.56-57).

²³ Note that neither in (41) nor in (42) it is implied that the agent acted in the beneficiary’s place, because the beneficiary could not perform the action; in other words, the context makes it clear that these are not occurrences of behalf beneficiary.

The PP *pró te paídōn kai prò gunaikōn* ‘for their children and wives’ indicates an agentive CB in (44). Note that the dative usually occurs with the same verb, as shown in (45):

45. *hóppōs hoi parà nēusi sóoi makhéointo Akhaioí*
 how 3SG.DAT by ship:DAT.PL safe:NOM.PL fight:PRS.OPT.3PL Achaean:NOM.PL
 “how the Achaeans fight safely for him by the ships” (Hom. *Il* 1.344).

The spatial meaning of *pró* is ‘before’, ‘in front of’. I will discuss the semantic extension in section 4. Here I would like to point out that the limited extent to which this type of coding occurs indicates that the semantic extension is based on a metaphor that has not undergone grammaticalization. Thus, it does not constitute a stable meaning of the preposition, and this type of PP cannot be considered a way of coding agentive CB in Homer.

3.6.3. Behalf beneficiary

In Homeric Greek, BB is coded through *hupér* with the genitive, as in Classical Greek, as shown in (46):

46. *Phoíbōi th’ hierén hekatómbēn rhéxai hupér Danaôn*
 Phoebus:DAT PTC sacred:ACC sacrifice:ACC offer:INF.AOR over Greek:GEN.PL
 “to offer a sacred sacrifice to Phoebus on behalf of the Greeks” (Hom. *Il* 1.444).

As we have seen in section 3.3.1, this type of PP could also code agentive CB in Classical Greek. This is not true of Homeric Greek, where agentive CB is coded through the dative.

In a small number of occurrences, BB is coded through *prós* with the genitive, as in (47):

47. *hoí te thémistas pròs Diòs eirúatai*
 DEM.NOM.PL PTC law:ACC.PL.F toward Z.:GEN guard:PRS.M/P.3PL
 “they uphold judgments on behalf of Zeus” (*Il* 1.238-239).

Note that in example (47) the beneficiary is intentionally involved in the situation, i.e. the beneficent acts on behalf of the beneficiary because this is the beneficiary’s intention. In (46), on the other hand, intentionality is not necessarily present on the side of the beneficiary: the beneficent may act on behalf of the beneficiary even if the latter is unaware of this, or not

in accordance. The difference is also made clear by the meaning of *prós* with the genitive in source expressions, which will be examined in section 4.2.3.

As we have seen in section 3.3.2, *prós* with the genitive rather codes semi-agentive CB in Classical Greek. So in the case of the two PPs in (46) and (47), i.e. *hupér* with the genitive and *prós* with the genitive, we find an extension from BB to CB, albeit in different conditions and with different types of CB: while *hupér* with the genitive extends to agentive CB, *prós* with the genitive extends to semi-agentive CB. A further difference is that *hupér* with the genitive still codes BB in Classical Greek, while *prós* with the genitive does not.

In sum, Homeric Greek displays a wide use of the dative not only for RB, but for CB as well; however, it presents a well established distinct coding BB. This fact provides evidence for a special status of BB.

3.6.4. Malefactive

Malefactive can be coded through the dative, as shown in (48) and (49):

48. *kakà dè Trōēssi medésthēn*
ill:N/A.PL PTC Trojan:DAT.PL devise:IMPF.M/P.3PL
“and were devising ills for the Trojans” (Hom. *Il.* 4.21);

49. *tōide d' egōn autōs thōrēxomai*
DEM.DAT PTC 1SG.NOM self:NOM arm:FUT.M/P.1SG
“I myself will put on my armor against him” (Hom. *Il.* 7.101).

Otherwise, malefactive can be coded through *prós* with the accusative, as in (50):

50. *pròs Trōas mákheai*
toward Trojan:ACC.PL fight:PRS.2SG
“you fight against the Trojans” (Hom. *Il.* 17.471).

With respect to Homeric Greek, Classical Greek continues the same constructions for the coding of malefactive, and adds some other prepositional phrase which, as we will see in section 4, have a directional meaning similar to the meaning of *prós* with the accusative.

4. A diachrony of Ancient Greek beneficiary

In the present section, I give a diachronic evaluation of the data surveyed in section 3. In section 4.1 I discuss the Greek evidence in the framework of the typology of beneficiaries sketched in section 2. In section 4.2 I describe the semantic extension to beneficiary and malefactive of the relevant prepositions, starting from their concrete spatial meaning.

4.1. *From Homeric to Classical Greek*

4.1.1. Homeric Greek: primarily a neutral language

The Homeric Greek data attest of a situation in which most types of beneficiary could be coded through the dative, with some prepositional phrases occurring possibly in passages which need disambiguation. Only BB displayed a more complex coding, requiring a preposition. With respect to the typology in Kittilä (2005), Homeric Greek is a neutral language, i.e. it belongs to the type in which recipient and all types of beneficiary are coded in the same way, with some fluid features, which concern BB.

One may wonder why BB displays such special status. In the first place, one may observe that, when BB is coded in the same way as CB, ambiguity may arise, as shown by the two possible interpretations of example (4) discussed in section 2.1. However, this is not the only answer. Indeed, BB is different from all other types of beneficiary because it adds the notion of substitution to the notion of benefit. This makes BB the type of beneficiary which is cognitively most complex; consequently it needs more complex coding.

Note further that the dative can also code malefactive, even though PPs are also comparatively frequent.

4.1.2. Classical Greek: a tripartite language

In Classical Greek, prepositional coding is also established for CB, with a distinction between agentive CB and event CB. In addition, event CB presents two possible coding that indicate the existence of different types, event CB and semi-agentive CB. A further difference is constituted by the fact that RB is still most frequently coded through the dative, but an alternative construction, i.e. *eis* with the accusative, also occurs, which can further code event

CB. Thus, Classical Greek is a tripartite language, in the terminology of Kittilä (2005).²⁴

Changes are summarized in the following two tables:

Table 1. Recipient and beneficiary coding in Homeric Greek

	dative	prepositional phrase
recipient	+	-
recipient beneficiary	+	-
concrete beneficiary	+	-
behalf beneficiary	-	+
malefactive	+	+

Table 2. recipient and beneficiary coding in Classical Greek

	dative	<i>es+acc</i>	other prepositions
recipient	+	-	-
recipient beneficiary	+	+	-
concrete beneficiary/event	+	+	-
concrete beneficiary/semi-agentive	-	-	+
concrete beneficiary/agentive	-	-	+
behalf beneficiary	-	-	+
malefactive	+	+	+

4.1.3. Degrees of beneficent vs. benefactum relevance

The three-fold way of coding CB points toward two possible participants of a beneficiary event besides the beneficiary, i.e. the beneficent, or agent, and the benefactum, or object. Note that agent CB is coded in the same way as BB. As I have remarked in section 4.1.1, BB has a special status, because it substitutes for the beneficiary. Indeed, as we have seen in 2.2, the notion of substitution is so relevant for BB that it overrides the parameter connected with the presence/absence of a benefactum. Thus, BB is the type of beneficiary for which the

²⁴ As we have seen in section 3.1, PPs with *eis* are not a possible alternative for recipient. When they occur in constructions that normally contain a dative, they add some different semantic content; in addition, they never occur with the verb ‘give’.

activity of the beneficent is viewed as most relevant.


Next is agentive CB: since there is no concrete benefactum of which the beneficiary can possibly gain control, benefit only derives from the beneficent's activity. In the case of semi-agentive CB there is no overt mention of an activity performed by the beneficent; still a possible controller who could play the role of beneficent is mentioned, albeit it is not conceptualized as an agent or actor. Again, there is no benefactum, so the beneficiary only benefits from the intentions of the possible beneficent.

In the case of event CB, no mention of any controlling entity is made. On the other hand, this type of CB may occur with a benefactum: thus, the beneficiary may get control over a concrete entity, much in the same way as in cases of prototypical beneficiary, that is RB. The similarity regards the existence of a benefactum: accordingly, both RB and event CB are possible recipients, and can be coded as such at all stages of the Ancient Greek language.

With RB, both the beneficent and the benefactum occur. In principle, the beneficiary benefits from both the activity of the beneficent and the eventual control over the benefactum. However, it is the second type of benefit which seems to be cognitively more salient, as shown by the fact that this type of beneficiary is frequently coded as a recipient cross linguistically.

Thus, a scale can be drawn that represents degrees of salience for beneficent and benefactum:

Figure 1. Beneficent vs. benefactum salience



4.2. Semantic extension of prepositions

Prepositions involved in beneficiary and malefactive coding are *eis* with the accusative, *pró* with the genitive, *prós* with the genitive, *hupér* with the genitive, *katá* with the genitive, *epí* with the accusative, and *prós* with the accusative. Greek prepositions derive from adverbs

²⁵ In the case of BB, as remarked in section 2.2.

which, as shown by the Homeric Greek evidence and evidence from the other Indo-European languages, originally had spatial meaning (cf. Chantraine 1953: 82). Thus, abstract meanings have been acquired in the course of time through metaphorical semantic extension, as I will show in the next sections.

4.2.1. *Es/eis*

The preposition *eis* with the accusative is the most common way of coding direction, both in Homer and in later writers. An example is (51):


51. *kaì gàr etúgkhanon prōímēn eis ástu oíkothēn aniōn*
 and PTC happen:IMPF.1SG yesterday to town:N/A from.home climb:PART.PRS.NOM
 “yesterday I happened to be going up to town from home” (Pl. *Symp.* 172a).

(A further occurrence can be found in example (61), section 4.2.5.)

In Homeric Greek, human landmarks can also occur with this preposition, while later *eis* remains mostly limited to non-human landmarks in direction expressions (see section 3.1). On the other hand, as I have shown in section 3.1, this preposition occurs with human landmarks in cases in which a relation between human beings is indicated, and in cases in which a participant, which could normally be coded as recipient or addressee, is conceived of as being the target of a trajectory. Thus, a relation of a human being to another is conceived of as a trajectory, and the human landmark is conceived of as the destination of the trajectory. The same holds when *eis* is extended to beneficiary, as well as to malefactive: note that the beneficiary or malefactive reading depends on other semantic information provided by the context, and not on the meaning of the preposition, in much the same way as in the case of the dative, which can also code both roles.

It must be remarked, as highlighted in section 3, that *eis* did extend to beneficiary after Homer, including RB, but it did not extend to recipient; it occurs with verbs that usually take a recipient only in exceptional occurrences, and not with the verb ‘give’. Indeed *eis* did eventually extend to recipient in Byzantine and Medieval Greek: so extension to beneficiary preceded extension to recipient. This order of extension is in accordance with findings regarding Nilo-Saharan languages described in Heine (1990). According to Heine, semantic extension concerning the roles mentioned here is as follows:

Figure 2. Semantic extension of allative markers in Nilo-Saharan languages (from Heine 1990:131)



The difference between allative and goal, as defined in Heine (1990), is that goal occurs with abstract landmarks and gerunds. Dative refers to all semantic roles typical of the dative case, thus including recipient. As for the relation between allative, beneficiary and purpose, I will discuss it in section 4.3.

Another abstract meaning of *eis*, already present in Homeric Greek, is purpose, as in (52):

52. *hê me mál' eis átēn koimēsate nēlēi húpnoī*
 PTC 1SG.ACC much to damage:ACC put.to.sleep:AOR.2PL harmful:DAT sleep:DAT
 “you put me to sleep to my damage with harmful sleep” (Hom. *Od.* 12.372).

I will return to this example in section 4.3.

4.2.2. *Hupér*+genitive

The spatial meaning of *hupér* with the genitive is ‘over’, ‘above’: the preposition profiles a relation of verticality without contact between a trajector and a landmark. An example is *nēòs húper* ‘over the ship’ in (53):


53. *dē tôte kuanēēn nephélēn éstēse Kroníōn nēòs húper*
 PTC then dark:ACC cloud:ACC lay:AOR.3SG of.Cronos:NOM ship:GEN over
 “the son of Cronos laid a dark cloud over the ship” (Hom. *Od.* 12.405-406).

Note that a trajector placed above or over a landmark may hide it from sight. This explains the occurrence of the same PP in (54):

54. *teíkhos eteikhíssanto neôn húper*
 wall:N/A build:AOR.MID.3PL ship:GEN.PL.F over
 “they built a wall to defend the ships” (*Il.* 7.449),

In (54), the wall is built in order to protect the ships, and hide them from the enemy, but it is not placed above them. However, the relevant feature here is the covering relation: the trajector hides the landmark from the sight of a possible viewer, as shown in figure 3:

Figure 3. Covering relation between trajector and landmark in example (54).



Covering also means that the trajector is seen by a viewer as if it were in the place of the landmark: in other words, for a viewer the trajector substitutes for the landmark. The notion of substitution provides a further path of extension that brings the preposition to code BB. A BB is typically an agent that acts in the place of somebody else, i.e. as his/her substitute. As shown in section 3.6, this extension had already taken place in Homeric Greek. Later on, in Classical Greek prose, *hupér* with the genitive also extended to agentive CB. Both a BB and a CB receive a benefit from somebody else’s activity. In addition, in the case of BB, the activity is performed in the place of the beneficiary. The extension from BB to CB is possible if the notion of substitution is left on the background, and only the notion of agency is profiled.

Besides, *hupér* with the genitive also extends to purpose after Homer, as shown in (55) and (56):

55. *etólmēsan gār ... ou mónon hupèr tēs hautôn sōtērias kinduneúein,*
 dare:AOR.3PL PTC NEG only over ART.GEN RFL.GEN.PL safety:GEN run.risk:INF.PRS
allà kai hupèr tēs tōn polemiōn eleutherías apothnēískein
 but also over ART.GEN ART.GEN.PL enemy:GEN.PL freedom:GEN die:INF.PRS
 “not only did they dare to run risk for their safety, they also died for the enemy’s
 freedom” (*Lys.* 2.68);

56. *hóti nūn ou perì dóxēs oud’ hupèr mérous khóras polemoúsin*
 that now NEG about glory:GEN NEG over part:GEN land:GEN fight:PRS.3PL

“that now they are not fighting for glory or for a piece of land” (Dem. 1.5).

In the above examples, it is the notion of substitution or exchange that enables extension of the PP to purpose. The purpose of the agent’s activity is conceived of as the entity that the agent receives in exchange for the activity. Thus, in (55) safety is what the agent could receive in exchange for running risks; similarly, in (56) it is said that someone will not receive freedom or a piece of land as exchange for the activity of fighting. I will return to the meaning of *hupér* with the genitive below, in section 4.3.

4.2.3. *Prós*+genitive


The meaning of *prós* is ‘(near)by’, ‘on the side of’. PPs formed by *prós* with the genitive indicate motion originating near a landmark, most often human or divine. They frequently occur in expressions of origin, usually where no concrete motion is indicated, as in (57):

57. *pròs gàr Diós eisin hápantes xeínoí te ptōkhoí te*
toward PTC Z.:GEN be:PRS.3PL all:NOM.PL stranger:NOM.PL PTC poor:NOM.PL PTC
“from Zeus come all strangers and poor” (*Od.* 6.207).

In example (57), Zeus is conceived as the origin of strangers and poor; the translation is only partly accurate: the verb in the sentence is the verb ‘be’, which, together with the preposition, acquires the meaning of English ‘to be from’. Indeed, origin can be conceived of as a type of abstract motion: if one is from somewhere, he or she must have been at his or her original location at some moment in the past. In Homer, as shown in section 3.6, this type of PP extends to BB. Let us now see how this semantic extension comes about.

In an event of motion, the starting point of a trajectory is known, as opposed to its ending point, which can only be known after the motion has ended, as shown in figure 4:

Figure 4. Source/origin and direction/goal in motion events



The origin is conceived of as a region from of which a trajector moves. Because the origin is normally known, it can be conceived of as controlling the entity (trajector) it originates. In cases such as (57), a human or divine landmark is conceived of as holding control over a state of affairs, albeit not acting. Note that control is one of the prototypical features of agents: consequently, the notion of behalf in this case implies that the beneficiary has some role in bringing about the state of affair, rather than simply have a benefit from it.

Already in Homer, with nouns denoting spatial regions or cardinal directions, *prós* with the genitive acquired the meaning of a locative: ‘on the side of’, as shown in example (58):

58. *dúō dé té hoi thúrai eisín, hai mèn pròs*
 two PTC PTC 3SG.DAT gate:NOM.PL be:PRS.3PL DEM.NOM.PL PTC toward
Boréao kataibataì anthrópoisin, hai d’ aù pròs
 north.wind:GEN descending:NOM.PL man:DAT.PL DEM.NOM.PL PTC PTC toward
Nóτου eisì theóterai
 south.wind:GEN be:PRS.3PL sacred:NOM.PL
 “two doors there are to the cave, one toward the North Wind, by which men go down,
 but that toward the South Wind is sacred” (Hom. *Od.* 13.109-110).

This locative meaning later extended to human landmarks, especially in cases of abstract location, as shown in example (30), discussed in section 3.3, and hence to beneficiary. Rather than BB as it did in Homer, *prós* with the genitive indicates semi-agentive CB: it occurs with the verb ‘be’, where it is said that someone is in favor (or on the side of) somebody else. To be on someone’s side usually means to be in favor of someone: for example, if one fights on the same side as somebody else, the two of them fight together, while if they are on opposite side they fight against each other.

As I have remarked in section 3.3, in BB expressions with *prós* in Homer the feature of intentionality had special relevance. In Classical Greek, only this feature remains: the beneficent is not conceived as performing some concrete action, but rather as having a favorable attitude toward the beneficiary. Note that again, as in the case of *hupér*, BB precedes CB.

4.2.4. *Pró*+genitive

PPs formed by *pró* with the genitive profile a spatial relation in which a trajector stands in front of a landmark. An example is (59):

59. *ándra ... eídon prò ptólios dedaígménon oxéi*
 man:ACC see:AOR.1SG before city:GEN slay:PART.PF.M/P.ACC sharp.DAT
khalkôî
 bronze:DAT
 “my husband I saw slain with the sharp bronze before our city” (*Il.* 19.291-292);

Somebody fighting in front of a landmark can be conceived of as defending the landmark: this explains the sporadic extension to agentive CB, described in section 3.6.2 (example (45)). As already remarked, however, this type of expression did not become grammaticalized as a possible way of coding beneficiary.

4.2.5. Malefactive

Besides the dative, malefactive is coded through *prós* with the accusative both in Homer and in later writers. This type of PP indicates direction, as shown in (60):

60. *hē mèn ébē pròs dôma*
 DEM.NOM PTC go:AOR.3SG toward home:N/A
 “she went home” (*Hom. Od.* 5.242).

As I have shown in 3.5, three other types of PP occur in malefactive expressions, i.e. *eis* with the accusative, *epí* with the accusative and *katá* with the genitive. I have already discussed the spatial meaning of *eis* with the accusative, which, besides extending to malefactive, also extends to beneficiary; as we have seen in section 4.2.1 it is the directional meaning of this PP that provides the path for semantic extension to beneficiary. The same holds for malefactive: it must further be remarked that *eis* with the accusative extends to all constructions in which the dative is also possible, that is RB, event CB, and malefactive.

The other two types of PP also code direction, but they profile different relations between the trajector and the landmark. *Epí* means ‘on’, and it indicates that a trajector moves along a trajectory that leads it on the (upper side) of the landmark, as shown in (61):

61. *anekhōrēsan, hoi mèn es tēn pólin hoi dè*
 return:AOR.3PL DEM.NOM.PL PTC to ART.ACC city:ACC DEM.NOM.PL PTC
epì naús
 on ship:ACC.PL
 “they returned, the one party to the city, the other to the ships” (*Th.* 3.91.5).

The preposition *katá* means ‘downwards’, and it indicates that a trajector follows a downward trajectory, which leads it to a landmark, as in (62):

62. *oînon epispé̄isōsi katà tôn kephaléōn*
wine:ACC pour:SUBJ.AOR.3PL down ART.GEN.PL head:GEN.PL
“they pour wine on the men’s heads” (Hdt. 4.62.3).

The four prepositions which may code malefactive in Ancient Greek have different meanings; however, they all have in common the fact that they indicate direction. In the extension to malefactive, only this feature remains relevant: a malefactive is conceived of as the endpoint of a trajectory. This process of semantic extension, by which one single feature of the meaning remains relevant for the new meaning, follows the well known Gestalt effect first described in Lakoff (1977).

4.3. *Beneficiary and purpose*

As we have seen above, two of the PPs that can code beneficiary also extend to purpose. The diachrony of the two extensions is different: in the case of *eis*, an allative preposition (it typically indicates direction with motion verbs), purpose already occurs in Homer, while beneficiary only occurs later; in the case of *hupér* beneficiary precedes purpose. The path of extension from space to abstract relations is also different, given the fact that *hupér* with the genitive is not a means of coding direction.

The relation between beneficiary and purpose has been touched upon in various works, given the fact that polysemy including the two roles is comparatively frequent cross linguistically (see Schmidtke forthcoming). However, its complexity does not seem to have been investigated in a satisfactory way, since similarity of the two roles is often taken for granted. For example, Rice and Kabata (2007: 481) write that “BENEFACTIVE seems to be an obvious special case of PURPOSE; when one acts for the benefit of another ..., he or she is usually acting purposefully”. Note that this view of beneficiary does not consider event beneficiary. Besides, the fact that one acts purposefully embraces many other situations (typically all actions), so the above remark does not seem to cast much light on the relation between the two roles.

4.3.1. Allative, purpose, beneficiary

The change by which an allative marker, such as Greek *eis* with the accusative, extends to purpose is widely studied (see for example Rice and Kataba 2007). The Greek evidence indicates that extension to beneficiary is later. However, there is no positive evidence that these two semantic extensions of allative are connected with each other: one can view the extension from allative to purpose and from allative to beneficiary as independent, in spite of being chronologically ordered. Note further that there may be ambiguity between purpose and beneficiary, as in the case of example (26) discussed in section 3.2. The example also shows that the occurrence of a human participant does not rule out the possibility of a purpose interpretation. Thus, at least in the case of *eis* with the accusative, one cannot say that the beneficiary or purpose interpretation is forced by the animacy feature of the participant involved.

That the two extensions are independent of each other is also in accordance with the findings described in Heine (1990) and mentioned earlier, in section 4.2.1. When an allative marker extends to purpose and beneficiary, the latter two roles are conceived of as targets of motion along a trajectory. The common metaphor may be expressed as ‘purposes or beneficiaries are destinations’.²⁶

4.3.2. Substitution, beneficiary and purpose

The case in which extension to beneficiary is provided by the notion of substitution has not attracted much attention. However, it is not only attested in the case of Ancient Greek *hupér* with the genitive. For example, the same semantic extension occurred in the case of the Latin preposition *pro* ‘before’, ‘in exchange for’, which extended to BB and later to other types of beneficiary (see Luraghi 2005a). Contrary to Greek *hupér* with the genitive, Latin *pro* did not extend to purpose, but to cause, thus showing that the relation between beneficiary and purpose is not so easy to explain as some authors hold it to be.

Let us go back to the Greek development. The notion of substitution conveyed by *hupér* with the genitive does not only explain extension to BB; it is also clear in cases in which this type of PP codes purpose, as in examples (55) and (56) in section 4.2.2. Both passages can be interpreted as implying that an agent acts in exchange of what he or she envisages as the purpose of his or her acting.

²⁶ The metaphor “purposes are destinations” is described in Lakoff and Johnson (1999). The authors provide bodily foundations for this metaphor, connected with directional motion.

It must also be remembered that *hupér* with the genitive also extends to agentive CB. If we go back to the passages in which this role is coded, we can see that the mental attitude of the agent toward the beneficiary is similar to the attitude of the agent toward the purpose in (27) and (28). Both purpose and beneficiary, as conceptualized by *hupér* with the genitive can be regarded as instances of another semantic role, reason. That this is the case is shown by occurrences in which *hupér* with the genitive cannot be viewed as indicating a beneficiary or a purpose, but rather the cause of mental state, as in (63):

63. *tís ouk àn theôn ēléēsen autoùs hupèr toû megéthous*
 INT.NOM NEG PTC god:GEN.PL pity:SUBJ.AOR.3SG 3PL.ACC over ART.GEN greatness:GEN
toû kindúnou?
 ART.GEN risk:GEN
 “which god would not have pitied them for the greatness of the risk?” (Lys. 2.40).

The cause of a mental state is the semantic role reason. In (63) *hupér* indicates exchange: this notion provides a link for all occurrences which contain *hupér* with the genitive. A reason is conceived of as an entity that an agent receives or achieves in exchange for his or her activity. This semantic role may play a role in bringing about polysemy involving cause, purpose and beneficiary, as I have shown in Luraghi (2005b). Note that in the case in which beneficiary and purpose are connected through the notion of reason, possible means of coding are prepositions that indicate location, rather directional motion.²⁷

5. Summary and conclusions

In this paper, various ways of coding beneficiary in Homeric and in Classical Greek are described, also in connection with the coding of neighboring semantic roles. The data point in the direction of a typology of beneficiary based on the occurrence or non-occurrence of other possible participants of the beneficiary situation, that is a beneficent and a benefactum. Also based on findings in Kittilä (2005) concerning coding similarities between beneficiary and recipient, I suggested the following types of beneficiary:

- RB or recipient beneficiary, which co-occurs with both a beneficent and a benefactum;
- event CB or event concrete beneficiary, which co-occurs with a benefactum but not with a beneficent;

²⁷ I cannot elaborate on this topic here, but see Luraghi (2001) and (2005b) for further discussion.

- agentive CB or agentive beneficiary, which co-occurs with a beneficent but not with a benefactum;
- BB or behalf beneficiary, which co-occurs with a beneficent acting on behalf of the beneficiary.

In Homeric Greek, most types of beneficiary are coded through the dative, in the same way as recipient, except for BB, which is coded through PPs. Following the typology in Kittilä (2005), Homeric Greek belongs to the neutral/fluid type. In Classical Greek, several other ways of coding beneficiary have emerged, which point towards a typology even more complex than the one suggested above. While recipient is still coded through the dative case, RB and event CB1 are coded through the dative or through the allative marker *eis* with the accusative. Event CB2, agentive CB and BB are coded through various PPs. Following the typology in Kittilä (2005), Classical Greek belongs to the tripartite type.

The distinction between event CB1 and event CB2 is based on the occurrence of an inactive possible beneficent in event CB2, whose intention is relevant for the benefit received by the beneficiary. Differences in coding point toward varying degrees of relevance of either the beneficent or the benefactum.

Malefactive can also be coded as RB and event CB 1, that is through the dative or *eis* with the accusative, or it can be coded by means of more specific prepositions, which mean ‘against’. In the latter case, the coding diverges from the coding of beneficiary.

Spatial metaphors underlying beneficiary coding are of two types, depending on whether they involve a preposition that indicates direction, namely the allative marker *eis* with the accusative, or a locative marker, that is *hupér* with the genitive and *prós* with the genitive. Both types of metaphor also extend to purpose, the latter limited to *hupér* with the genitive.

In the case of the allative marker, extension to purpose precedes extension to beneficiary; both types of semantic extension are based on the notion of abstract motion along a trajectory. In the case of the locative marker *hupér* with the genitive, on the contrary, extension to beneficiary precedes extension to purpose. The first type of beneficiary to be coded through *hupér* with the genitive is BB, indicating the relevance of the notion of substitution for this metaphor. The connecting link between beneficiary and purpose in the case of *hupér* with the genitive is the notion of exchange, and the semantic space in which the two roles overlap is that of reason.

Abbreviations

Grammatical glosses

1	first person
2	second person
3	third person
ACC	accusative
AOR	aorist
ART	article
COMP	comparative
DAT	dative
DEM	demonstrative
FUT	future
GEN	genitive
IMP	imperative
IMPF	imperfect
INDEF	indefinite
INF	infinitive
INSTR	instrumental
INT	interrogative
MID	middle
M/P	medio-passive
N/A	nominative/accusative neuter
NEG	negation
NOM	nominative
OPT	optative
P	passive
PART	participle
PF	perfect
PL	plural
PLPF	pluperfect
POSS	possessive
PRS	present
PTC	particle
REL	relative
RFL	reflexive
SG	singular
SUBJ	subjunctive

Note: For the sake of brevity, singular number is not indicated for nominal categories (except for personal and possessive pronouns), while active diathesis and indicative mood are not indicated for verbal categories; medio-passive diathesis is indicated only when it is relevant (i.e. not in the case of *media tantum*); gender is not indicated except in the case of nominative-accusative neuter, which has a special gloss (N/A for neuter).

Classical authors

Dem.	Demosthenes
Hdt.	Herodotus
Hom.	Homer
Isoc.	Isocrates
Lys.	Lysias
Pl.	Plato
Th.	Thucydides

Works

<i>Il.</i>	<i>Iliad</i>
<i>Od.</i>	<i>Odyssey</i>
<i>Protag.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>Phlb.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>
<i>Rep.</i>	<i>The Republic</i>
<i>Symp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i>

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